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Abstract. We investigate the distillation of secret key from classical data when these data are de-
rived from quantum states by measurements. Underlying quantum states with a so-called symmetric 
extension can never lead to a secret key via one-way communication but must be processed further 
by LOCC operations. We show that if a symmetric extension can be broken by LOCC operations, 
it is also possible to break it with a single filter. For Bell-diagonal and some other two-qubit states 
we characterize the states with symmetric extension, and give a conjectured formula for the general 
two-qubit case. We apply these results to the the 4-state and 6-state QKD protocols to show that the 
two-way procedure proposed by Chau fails for error rates beyond 20% and 27.6% precisely because 
at that point it fails to break symmetric extensions. 
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PACS: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn 
QKD AND SYMMETRIC EXTENSION 
Any implementation of quantum key distribution consists of two parts. First the hard-
ware distributes and measures quantum particles, producing correlated data. Then the 
software subjects the generated data to various tests and, if it passes, creates a secret key 
from it. Whether the implementation is entanglement-based or an equivalent prepare and 
measure scheme, the data must show evidence of effective entanglement for the output 
to be a secret key [1]. However, the converse is not known, that is, whether the data can 
be fashioned into a secret key given proof of effective entanglement. 
Certainly this is not always possible if the key distillation protocol is restricted to one 
way communication. In this case there exist entangled states with a so-called symmetric 
extension [2], meaning that an eavesdropper will be in at least as good a position as 
one party to guess the other party's data. Formally, a bipartite state PAB has a symmetric 
extension if there exists a state PABB' on an extended system ABB', which satisfies the 
two properties 
ttfi' ipABB') = pAB and VBB'PABB'V^B' = PABB' • 
Here VBB' is the unitary swap operator, swapping systems B and B'. The system B' 
is then a copy of B and, for QKD purposes, is assumed to be in the hands of an 
eavesdropper along with the rest of the purifying system. The symmetry requirement 
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on pABB' may seem to be more restrictive than necessary on first sight. The seemingly 
weaker requirement tTB'{pABB') = trs(PABB') = PAB gives an equivalent condition, since 
if such a state exists, the state ^(PABB' + VeB'PABB'VJJg/) also exists and has the required 
symmetry. 
We argue that symmetric extensions are also relevant in the general context of QKD 
with two-way postprocessing. Any such protocol consists of a finite number of rounds of 
one-way communication in alternating directions, and since the protocol must eventu-
ally terminate, the effective state shared prior to the final round must have no symmetric 
extension in order for the protocol to succeed. If the effective state prior to the postpro-
cessing had a symmetric extension, it must be broken at some point along the way. 
REDUCTION TO TWO COMMUNICATION ROUNDS 
By concerning ourselves only with the question of whether a key can be distilled or 
not, and not with the rate of distillation, the problem can be simplified further. Assume 
that each round of one-way postprocessing is done on blocks with a finite number 
of systems. We may then limit ourselves to filtering operations, which are general 
quantum operations which can succeed or fail. If more than one outcome of Bob's 
generahzed filtering measurement succeeds, we could as well preselect one of them 
and only consider this a successful outcome. 
Moreover, the number of rounds in the protocol can be reduced to two, as follows. 
Assume that the last one-way round is from Alice to Bob. For each block that Bob op-
erates on in his last round, he can guess Ahce's announcements relating to the quantum 
systems in that block ahead of time and start immediately with his last round. Alice will 
notice if this guess was wrong and tell Bob to discard that block. For the tiny fraction of 
blocks where Bob was right, Alice can proceed with her last round. This means that if 
a QKD protocol succeeds in distilling secret key from an underlying quantum state with 
symmetric extension, it must be possible to break the symmetric extension only with a 
filter on a block of copies of the state. [3] 
WHICH STATES HAVE SYMMETRIC EXTENSION? 
To identify strategies for breaking a symmetric extension, we need to characterize states 
with symmetric extension. We can show that these states can be written as convex 
combinations of states with a pure symmetric extension. For a pure state on ABB', 
the spectra on both sides of a splitting must be the same because of the Schmidt 
decomposition, so ^{PAB) = -^(PB)- If a pure state is a symmetric extension of PAB, 
it must satisfy pAB = PAB' and therefore also pB = PB'- Any state with a pure symmetric 
extension therefore has a spectrum which is equal to the spectrum of its reduced density 
operator on 5, 
^{.PAB) = ^{.PB)-
We can prove that in the special case when A and B are both qubits—^but never 
otherwise—this condition is also sufficient for having a pure symmetric extension [4]. 
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Using this condition and other techniques we have found necessary and sufficient 
conditions for special classes of two-qubit states to have a general symmetric extension. 
These classes are Bell-diagonal states, rank-2 states and states where only one of the 
off-diagonal terms in the density matrix is non-zero (in the latter case the state is either 
separable or the non-zero element can be chosen to be poo,ii = Pii,oo by a local change 
of basis). In all these cases the conditions can be shown to be equivalent to [4] 
HPB) > tr(piB)-4Vdet(pAB). 
We conjecture that this also is a necessary and sufficient condition for all other two-qubit 
states. The conjecture is also supported by numerical evidence. 
BB84 AND 6-STATE PROTOCOLS 
In the BB84 and 6-state protocols with standard sifting, the states from which the 
correlations arise can be taken to be Bell-diagonal without loss of generality. Moreover, 
most postprocessing schemes preserve this property throughout the postprocessing. It is 
therefore possible to check for which states a given postprocessing breaks a symmetric 
extension. The currently best known procedure in terms of distilling key from more 
states is to first perform so-called B-steps on two qubit pairs and then finish off with 
one-way error correction and privacy amplification [5]. The B-steps is the only part 
where two-way communication is required, and it therefore has to break the symmetric 
extension if there is one to begin with. In a B-step Alice and Bob both announce the 
parity of two bits and if they are equal they keep the first bit. If the parity bits are 
different they know there was an error on one of the bits and discard both. If this is 
done n times it requires n rounds of communication in each direction, since both parties 
need to know which pairs to discard before proceeding to the next round. As mentioned 
above, this can be reduced to two one-way rounds without changing the threshold at the 
cost of reducing the key rate drastically. Ahce and Bob would then operate on blocks of 
N = 2" qubits, and they both announce the parity of one bit with all the other bits and 
keep this bit only if all the parities agree. This procedure is called advantage distillation 
[6] and can of course be done on any N ^2" as well. 
Chau [7] showed that this procedure can distill key for up to a quantum bit error rate 
of 20.0 % for BB84 and 27.6 % for the 6-state protocol. More precisely, if the initial 
Bell-diagonal state is characterized by the eigenvalues Pi,ie {0,x,y,z} for eigenvectors 
(1 (g) cJi)(|00) +1 l l ) ) /2 , it will distill key whenever {po-Pzf > {Po+Pz){Px + Py)- We 
define 
Dc := log2 [Po-P 
\2 
XPO + Pz){Px + Py), 
SO that the condition for secret key generation becomes Dc > 0. One B-step doubles Dc 
so if Dc < 0 it will always remain so, while if Dc > 0 it can be increased to an arbitrary 
positive value by repeating the B-steps. Similarly, advantage distillation on blocks of A^  
copies gives D^^ = NDc-
The values of Dc can also be connected to symmetric extension. It turns out [3] that 
all states that have Dc < 0 have a symmetric extension. Since B-steps and advantage 
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distillation cannot change the sign of Dc, they will never break the symmetric extension 
in this case. Similarly, no states that have Dc>2 have a symmetric extension. Therefore, 
M > 1 — log2(I>c) rounds of B-steps, or advantage distillation on block size N >-^ will 
break the symmetric extension. 
Acm et al. [8] have previously shown that if Dc < 0, there is an attack by Eve 
that will prohibit Alice and Bob from generating a secret key by advantage distillation 
followed by one-way processing. From our analysis it follows that this impossibility 
can be understood as a failure of the two-way part of the protocol to break a symmetric 
extension. By using our criterion for symmetric extension of Bell-diagonal states, no 
actions by the eavesdropper need to be taken into account explicitly. 
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